If we feel indignant at an injustice, judgement and emotion are bound up together. Such a reaction is not deliberative in the way reason demands, but a spontaneous judgement is a judgement nevertheless. We move though life making moral decisions—should I open the door for that person? Should I report a litterer? Should I hand in some lost money? Should I vote for that person? Should I sent my child to a private school? Should I have an abortion?—and each one, whether made spontaneously or after consideration, is stimulated and properly informed by emotions. It is untenable to maintain that deliberation using principles of reason alone, if this is at all possible, is more likely to result in better judgement than decisions made in the heat of passion. [….]
People who argue that moral judgements, or any decision, can be disentangled from emotional responses are not clarifying a messy situation but are assigning priority to one emotion over all others—the desire for emotionless activity. Ad hominem arguments are generally frowned on, but sometimes they help us understand positions more clearly.
[….] Drawing on recent advances in moral psychology, Haidt challenges any causal role of reasoning in making moral judgements, arguing instead that in most cases reasoning comes into play only as a post hoc rationalisation of judgements that are based on sudden moral intuitions.
~ Clive Hamilton / The freedom paradox: Towards a post-secular ethics / p.154-155 & 158